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Abstract 
Experts in Artificial Intelligence (AI) development predict that advances in the development of intelligent 
systems and agents will reshape vital areas in our society. Nevertheless, if such an advance is not made prudently 
and critically-reflexively, it can result in negative outcomes for humanity. For this reason, several researchers in 
the area are trying to developed a robust, beneficial, and safe concept of AI for the preservation of humanity and 
the environment. Currently, several of the open problems in the field of AI research arise from the difficulty of 
avoiding unwanted behaviors of intelligent agents and systems, and at the same time specifying what we really 
want such systems to do, especially when we look for the possibility of intelligent agents acting in several 
domains over the long term. It is of utmost importance that artificial intelligent agents have their values aligned 
with human values, given the fact that we cannot expect an AI to develop human moral values simply because of 
its intelligence, as discussed in the Orthogonality Thesis. Perhaps this difficulty comes from the way we are 
addressing the problem of expressing objectives, values, and ends, using representational cognitive methods. A 
solution to this problem would be the dynamic approach proposed by Dreyfus, whose phenomenological 
philosophy shows that the human experience of being-in-the-world in several aspects is not well represented by 
the symbolic or connectionist cognitive method, especially in regards to the question of learning values. A 
possible approach to this problem would be to use theoretical models such as SED (situated embodied dynamics) 
to address the values learning problem in AI. 
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Introduction 
Researchers and specialists in Artificial Intelligence (AI) development stipulate that within 10 years 
many human activities will be surpassed by machines in terms of efficiency. Several aspects of our 
public policies will need to be modified to accommodate such advances, which promise to reshape 
areas such as transportation, health, economics, military fighting, lifestyle, etc. (GRACE et al. 2017). 
There is also concern about the risks that machines with a high level of human or superhuman 
intelligence may bring to humanity in the coming decades. A survey conducted by Müller and 
Bostrom (2016) consisted of building a questionnaire to assess progress in the field of AI research and 
prospects for the future, interviewing various experts in the field. The questionnaire showed that, on 
average, there is a 50% chance that high-level (human) machine intelligence will be achieved between 
2040 and 2050, reaching a 90% probability by 2075. It is also estimated that this intelligence will 
exceed human performance in 2 years (10% chance) to 30 years (75% chance) after reaching human 
intelligence levels (MÜLLER; BOSTROM, 2016).  
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However, in the same survey 33% of respondents classified this development in AI as “bad” or 
“extremely bad” for humanity (MÜLLER; BOSTROM, 2016). As there is no guarantee that such 
systems will be “good” for mankind, we should investigate further the future of superintelligence and 
the risks it poses to the human race. There are several open questions and problems that need to be 
solved. How will we remedy the economic impacts of AI in order to avoid negative effects such as 
mass unemployment (FREY; ORSBORNE, 2013)? How can we prevent the self-motivation of jobs 
from pushing the distribution of income into a law of disproportionate power among classes, genders, 
and race (BRYNJOLFSSON; MCAFEE, 2014)? Can autonomous lethal weapons be built without 
changing humanitarian rights, and, should autonomous weapons be completely banned (DOCHERTY, 
2012) (CHURCHILL; ULFSTEIN, 2000)? How can we ensure privacy by applying machine learning 
to confidential data such as medical data sources, phone lines, emails, online behavior patterns 
(ABADI et al. 2016)? How can we understand what complex AI systems are doing to iteratively 
classify and reconstruct images from neural networks (MORDVINTSEV, OLAH, TYKA, 2015)? 
Some researchers have already created models (ASI-PATH) of how an AI could cause some kind of 
catastrophe, becoming super-intelligent through recursive self-improvement (BARRET; BAUM, 
2017), something known in the AI literature as a Singularity. Such models suggest scenarios where 
intelligent agents, after obtaining some kind of strategic advantage (DSA - decisive strategic 
advantage or MSA - major strategic advantage), such as advances in nanotechnology or robotics, 
could achieve considerable power of domination (BOSTROM; ĆIRKOVIĆ, 2008). The scenarios 
suggest different types of takeovers by artificial intelligent systems, ranging from fast takeoffs, 
situations where a drastic takeover by such systems occurs, to slow takeoffs, where gradually the 
human race becomes more dependent and, to some extent, under the conrol of AI (SOTALA, 2018). 
The development of an AI ethic presupposes, in fact, the intuitive formulations of Isaac Asimov's so-
called Three Laws of Robotics (1950), at a time when this theme still seemed relegated to the realm of 
science fiction - recalling that such ethical-moral codifications were introduced in a 1942 tale, 
Runaround: “(1) A robot may not harm a human being or, by inaction, allow a human being to be 
harmed; (2) a robot must obey the orders given by human beings, except where such orders conflict 
with the First Law; (3) a robot must protect its own existence, provided such protection does not 
conflict with the First or Second Law. In our century, this ethical orientation of doing no harm to 
mankind was extended not only to robots and robotic artifacts, but to machines and intelligent devices 
generally associated with AI resources. 
Thus, Shulman (2010, pp. 2) suggests a model that explains in which situations an AI would abandon 
cooperation with the human race and take hostile action, in which an artificial agent that believes it has 
a   probability of being successful, if it initiates aggression, receiving some expected utility [EU 
(Success)], and with a (     ) probability of failing, receiving [EU (Failure)]. If it gives up the 
aggressive strategy, the agent receives utility [EU (Cooperation)]. The AI will rationally initiate the 
aggression only if: 
                                                 
Safety Issues in AI 
Ultimately, there is a consensus in the literature: it is extremely important that AI development is done 
in a safe, beneficial and robust manner. An article published by Amodei et al. (2016) entitled 
“Concrete Problems in AI Safety” lists a number of open problems in the field of AI research that 
must be addressed if we are to reap the benefits of AI without compromising our safety. These 
problems are classified into specification and robustness problems, and are the current barriers to be 
overcome in the area (LEIKE et al. 2017). 
To better synthesize and develop the content of this study, we will refer briefly only to specification 
errors. Specification errors occur when the utility function of the AI is poorly specified by 
programmers, causing unwanted and even harmful results, even if the learning is perfect with 
explicitly clear data (AMODEI et al. 2016). Some examples of specification errors are negative side 
effects, reward hacking, and safe interruption (corrigibility). 
Negative side effects occur when the maximization of the reward function focuses on achieving a goal 
while the agent ignores important factors in the environment, causing potential cross effects. In reward 
hacking, the AI agent finds a solution to its goal that maximizes its reward function, but in an 
unexpected way, perverting the intention of the programmers (AMODEI et al. 2016). The Safe 
Interruption or Corrigibility concerns how we can be able to interrupt an agent if it is behaving in an 
unexpected way, and in a certain way, correct the detected errors without the agent opposing to 
interruptions. (SOARES et al. 2015). 
Two theses published by Bostrom, (2012), firstly proposed by Omohundro (2008) in his seminal paper 
“The Basic AI Drives”, point out how these problems can present a risk. The Thesis of Intrumental 
Convergence shows us how a series of self-improvement and preservation goals can be pursued by 
any intelligent agent with a terminal goal. We can formulate this thesis as follows: 
Several instrumental objectives can be identified, which are convergent in the sense 
that their attainment would increase the chances of the agent's terminal objective, 
implying that these instrumental objectives are likely to be pursued by any 
intelligent agent (BOSTROM, 2012, p. 6). 
Without careful engineering of these systems, risks with an “intelligence explosion” (the exponential 
increase in the cognitive capacity of the agent) can create agents much more powerful than our ability 
to control them. On the other hand, and correlated to the first thesis, the Orthogonality Thesis  
proposes that intelligence and final objectives have independent and orthogonal properties. The 
hypothesis is argued as follows: 
Intelligence and ultimate goals are orthogonal axes along which possible agents can 
freely vary. In other words, more or less any level of intelligence could, in principle, 
be combined with more or less any final objective (BOSTROM, 2012, p. 3). 
The thought behind the orthogonality thesis is analogous to the so-called Hume's Guillotine (also 
known in English as Hume's fork or Hume's law), opposing what is factually and empirically 
verifiable (matters of fact and real existence) to what should be, in rational terms, normative and 
counterfactual (relations of ideas). Hume observed a significant difference between descriptive 
statements and prescriptive or normative statements, and therefore, it would not be obvious, self-
evident (self-evident) or valid (valid) to derive the latter from the former. The undue passage from 
being (Is) to being (Ought), which would be one of the seminal problems of research in metaethics, 
normative ethics and applied ethics in the twentieth century, was noted by the Scottish philosopher in 
a famous passage in section I of part I of his Treatise of Human Nature: 
 In every moral system I have encountered to date, I have always noticed that the 
author follows for some time the common way of reasoning, establishing the 
existence of God, or making observations regarding human affairs, when 
suddenly I am surprised to see that, instead of the usual propositional 
copulations, as it is and is not, I do not find a single proposition that is not 
connected to another by one should or should not. This change is imperceptible, 
but of the utmost importance. For as this must or must not express a new 
relationship or affirmation, it would need to be noted and explained; at the same 
time, it would need to give a reason for something that seems totally 
inconceivable, that is, how this new relationship can be deduced from entirely 
different ones (HUME, 2009, p. 509). 
 
Just as descriptive, purely factual statements can only bind or imply other descriptive or factual 
statements and never standards, the  problems of orthogonality and value alignment consist in 
guaranteeing, if an AGI (artificial general intelligence, that is, a hypothetical intelligence of a machine 
with the capacity to understand or learn any intellectual task that a human being can perform) were to 
develop enough intelligence to have power over the human species, that such intelligence would do 
with human beings only what we would wish or accept it to be done. 
In this sense, the problem of alignment is identical to what we see in moral philosophy with regard to 
utilitarianism, in that the maximization of utility by some moral agent can culminate in morally 
repugnant conclusions, including the violation of the rights of others. Although it may guarantee the 
resolution of tasks in computational time (polynomial), the mere efficiency or optimization of 
procedures does not ensure normative universalizability (as it would be, moreover, a basic premise of 
ethical deontological and non-utilitarian models) and may eventually conflict with the interests or 
rights of other people. We should also note that the ethics of artificial intelligence is part of the ethics 
of technology in general and, specifically, for robots, learning machines and other artifacts and 
artificially intelligent entities. 
In our approach, the AI ethic comprises both a robotics (robotic ethics), which is concerned with the 
moral behavior of human beings when designing, building, using and programming artificially 
intelligent beings, and a machine ethic, which is concerned with the moral behavior of artificial moral 
agents themselves. Both bioethics and neuroethics would have much to learn, to teach and to interact 
with the ethics of artificial intelligence, especially through the interface of artificial life models, 
genomic editing and neural networks with the ethical-normative challenges of orthogonality, value 
alignment and transumanism, integrating the neurobiological, cultural and technological legacies of 
the homo sapiens sapiens. 
Anthropomorphic bias tends to shape the entire spectrum of possible minds and intelligences, but this 
is a mistake, known as the Fallacy of Mind Projection (JAYNES, 2003). On the contrary, we consider 
intelligence as a function of optimizing an agent's ability to achieve goals in a wide variety of 
environments with limited resources (LEGG, 2008). To best exemplify this thinking, we use a quote 
from Dijkstra, (1984), “the question of whether a machine can think is as relevant as the question of 
whether submarines can swim”. The upper limit of brute processing for the whole known universe, 
imposed by the laws of physics, is 10
120
 operations in 10
90
 bits (10
120
 bits including the degrees of 
gravitational freedom) (LLOYD, 2002). The human level of information processing is 10
11
 operations 
per second (MORAVEC, 1998). This difference between the human level and the highest possible 
degree of optimization leaves open a wide range of possible levels of superhuman intelligence 
(SOTALA, 2010). In the Kantian sense, reason can be defined as the ability to obtain logical 
inferences or, in a systematic way, the ability to synthesize in unity, through comprehensive principles, 
the concepts provided by the intellect, in that agents  use reason to establish and pursue ends (goals, 
purposes, Zwecken), using the rest of nature as a means to their ends. Humanity is thus considered as 
an end in itself and a terminal end of nature (ALLISON, 1996). 
For these reasons, the alignment of values between AI and humans is an important problem to be 
solved in the area of machine ethics (SOARES; FALLESTEIN, 2014). Practically all problems of 
specification, robustness and value alignment seem to occur at the same point, when our 
representations of values or final objectives (goals) lose their meaning, or are misinterpreted. Is the 
objective-representational approach doomed to error? Would the cognitive models used in the creation 
of artificial intelligent agents, especially symbolism and connectionism, be incapable of expressing the 
meaning of human values? If so, would there be any alternative? 
 Cognitive Models: Symbolism and Conexionism 
Since the late 1950s, the discussion about cognition and intelligence has been permeated by the 
computational framework, also known as symbolic view. This perspective starts from the assumption 
that cognitive systems are intelligent in that they can encode knowledge into symbolic representations. 
Symbolists believe that through sets of “if-then” rules and other forms of calculation for symbolic 
algorithms, all cognition is accomplished by manipulating such representations (THAGARD, 1992). 
Newell, (1990), defined the computationalist proposal, which is also referred to as the “Physical 
Symbol System Hypothesis”, as follows: Natural cognitive systems are intelligent by virtue of being 
physical systems that manipulate symbols in such a way as to present intelligent behaviour, codifying 
knowledge about the external world in symbolic structures (NEWELL, 1990, pp. 75-79). Newell has 
dedicated much of his work to building systems that express his vision of a physical symbol system. 
His most promising model is known as SOAR. SOAR is a symbolic computational system that 
formulates its tasks based on symbol and goal hierarchies, thus generating an algorithmic production 
and decision making system for problem solving (NEWELL, 1990, p. 39). 
In the conexionist model, emerging properties such as the phenomenon of cognition are high level 
effects that depend on lower level phenomena. Thus, the conexionist hypothesis encapsulates the idea 
that the fact that most determines the cognitive capacity of an agent is not the ability of representative 
manipulation, but its architecture. Thus, conexionists attack the problem of cognition by performing 
reverse engineering on the central nervous system, copying its basic processing unit, namely the 
neuron (Churchland and Sejnowski, 1992, p. 2). Sejnowski (1988, p. 7) notes in his conexionist 
hypothesis: “The intuitive processor is a dynamic sub-conceptual connecionist system that does not 
admit a complete, formal and precise description on a conceptual level”. 
Thus, theories of cognition in AI (symbolism, connectionalism and dynamism) can be considered 
theoretical structures, since they provide us with the filters, analogies and metaphors by which we try 
to understand the phenomenon of cognition, and thus create theoretical models that can generate 
simulations to be tested (BEER, 1998). The symbolism, for example, highlights the internal 
representations of the system or agent, and the algorithms by which these representations are 
manipulated. Connectionalism emphasizes the neural network architecture, the learning algorithm, the 
preparation of training data and the protocol used (ELIASMITH, 1996). 
However, the limitations of the symbolic computational hypothesis, especially in the aspects of time, 
architecture, computing and representation, led researchers to consider new theoretical models, such as 
the dynamic hypothesis (van GELDER, 1998). And as much as the conexionist model is similar to the 
dynamic model in the aspects pointed out in the symbolic model (time, architecture, computing and 
representation), the conexionist model still fails to produce agents that can solve the above mentioned 
problems of specification and robustness. 
In this article we do not adopt an anti-representationalist position, as we humans constantly use and 
manipulate representations, as in language, writing, speech, music and other forms of abstract 
thinking. However, we sceptically position ourselves in relation to the function of representations in 
systems that involve value-objective-methods, and therefore goal-oriented behavior. Perhaps, in some 
cases, the roles played by the internal states of a cognitive agent simply cannot be interpreted as 
representative (FRANKISH; RAMSEY, 2014). 
Criticism of the Symbolic Method 
One of the biggest criticisms raised against the symbolic computing model is the difficulty in meeting 
time constraints. When trying to replicate the phenomenon of cognition van Gelder and Port, (1998, p. 
2) states that the symbolists “leave time out of the picture”. Since the objective of cognitive science is 
to describe the behavior of natural cognitive agents, and by definition these agents operate in real time, 
a cognitive model that replicates the human experience of cognition must present real-time cognitive 
processes (in the case of humans: ± 10 milliseconds) (van GELDER; PORT, 1998). 
The limits imposed by symbolic architecture are another source of criticism of the computational 
method. For Newell, (NEWELL, 1990, p. 82), the behavior is determined by a variable content being 
processed by a fixed structure, which is the architecture. Dynamists criticize this view of the cognitive 
system as “a box” within a body, in turn within a physical environment. However, where do we draw 
the line that divides the “box” from your body? And, more controversially, the body with the 
environment? Van Geldere and Port, (1998, p. 8), analyze the internal architecture in the cognitive 
agent as not being a fixed structure, where all aspects of cognition, brain-body-environment, as 
mutually influencing each other continuously. 
Consequently, this view of architecture often refers to the symbolic method as a computational 
method, because it describes the mind as a special type of computer. This characterization is totally in 
accordance with the architecture proposed by Newell, (1990), and identifies the mental computer with 
the brain. The body, through the sensory organs, delivers to the cognitive system (brain) 
representations of the state of its environment; the system on its part calculates an appropriate 
response and the body carries the action (van GELDER; PORT, 1998, p. 1). However, this system of 
perceiving-planning-acting ignores important phenomena in decision making, such as reflex actions, 
and the speed with which such actions are expressed in real cognitive agents, showing once again that 
the symbolic computational method has no basis with the biological and physical reality of the 
cognition phenomenon. 
Hubert Dreyfus (1992) was one of the most prominent critics of the symbolic representational 
approach in the field of AI research. Based on the hermeneutic-existentialist philosophy proposed by 
Martin Heidegger, Dreyfus indicated in his works that the manipulation of symbols and 
representations is not enough to generate the non-representational type of existence of a being in the 
world (Dasein). At the bottom of this impasse there remains a criticism of materialist Cartesian 
thought and subject-object dualism: materialist Cartesianism that attempts, without success, to 
replicate the whole world “inside the mind” is doomed to fail according to Dreyfus, because it is 
impossible to contain the world inside the mind for the simple fact that the world is infinitely complex 
and we are finite creatures (DREYFUS, 2007). Thus, a self-contained, rigid system is not capable of 
duplicating the type of cognitive agent we desire. Perhaps this indicates to us that representations and 
experience must operate together for the former to have meaning. 
Conexionism and Value Learning 
We can see that many of the problems mentioned above come from the difficulty of programmers in 
expressing the meaning of what is proposed by the language (specification errors) and how this should 
change when the context of the environment evolves (robustness errors). Be it the representative 
cognitive model, using rules of behavior (se-enton), or the conexionist model, using artificial neural 
networks with reward functions, we still reach the same impasse. How to express our goals and align 
the values of artificial intelligent agents with ours? 
The related approach encounters several difficulties in this task, which are explored in more detail 
below. Commonly artificial neural networks are trained in a supervised manner, using labeled training 
data, however this method may not be the safest for value learning. Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1992), cite 
an example where a machine learning system trained to classify, or not, military ground vehicles 
hidden among the trees. The classifier during the training was able to identify with great precision the 
desired vehicles, however, the system had a fuzzy performance with images outside the training group. 
It was later discovered that the set of photos used for training containing vehicles were taken on a 
sunny day, while the images without the vehicles were made on a cloudy day. What the classifier was 
really identifying was the brightness of the images. Potentially, learning values by induction is 
susceptible to this failure (SOARES, 2016). 
For this reason it is expected that artificial intelligent agents possess a property called corrigibility. It 
is necessary that such systems can have their reward function or value hierarchy adjusted in case 
something unwanted happens. However, it is also necessary that the same agents cannot influence 
their own learning environment or reward function, much less prevent it from being modified. There 
are currently no solutions to this problem (SOARES; FALLENSTEIN, 2015). In addition, both 
supervised training methods, which use labeled data and reinforcement learning, which use utility 
functions as a proxy for desirable results, are extremely vulnerable in identifying ambiguities 
(SOARES, 2016), as evidenced by “Sorcerer's Apprentice” problems and situations where the system, 
due to divergence in testing environments and new environments, and also goal mis specification, has 
the opportunity to hack its reward (BOSTROM, 2014). The reward hacking scenario, or 
“wireheading,” is wrongly compared to humans stimulating their own pleasure (e.g. drug use). Human 
appetite is satiable; an artificial agent with the power to maximize its own reward will not stop its 
“compulsive” behavior. It will even seek ways and means to perpetuate its self-compensating behavior 
free from interference (OMOHUNDRO, 2009). 
The utility function can be explained by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theorem (von 
NEUMANN; MORGENSTERN, 1953). The theorem configures utility functions through preference 
sorting: A is preferred to B, or B is preferred to A, or both have the same preference value. A utility 
function allows that, given the state of the agent and the state of the world in general, an agent 
decision is generated between two or more options. The concept of utility function is a mathematical 
formalization for the notion of human values and is widely used in economics and decision theory. 
However, one of the best known problems of this model is the empirical fact that humans violate the 
axioms of utility theory and do not have consistent utility functions (TVERSKY; KAHNEMAN, 
1981).  
An alternative would be to model the intent of operators using inverse reinforcement learning (NG; 
RUSSELL, 2000): where one agent tries to identify and maximise the reward function of some other 
agent in the environment (usually a human operator). However, human preferences cannot necessarily 
be captured by observations alone, and if they are modeled optimally inverse reinforcement learning 
demonstrate the problem of learning “errors” or “biases” of human behaviour as valid solutions. 
Recent advances in the area, such as the CIRL (Cooperative Inverse Reinforcement Learning) training 
model would solve this problem: instead of estimating and adopting the human being's reward 
function as its own, the system tries to solve a POMDP (Partially Observable Markov decision 
process), leading to a cooperative learning behavior, in which the system or agent tries to maximize 
the operator's reward function, but without knowing what it is (HADFIELD-MENELL, 2016). 
However, this approach generates problems of interpretation, such as the identification of ambiguity 
and coordination problems between the agents involved in POMDP. 
Moreover, situations where humans are part of the reward system of an AI, also called human-in-the-
loop, are not considered safe, as there is strong evidence to believe that artificial intelligent agents 
would be inclined to manipulate the human part of their reward mechanism if it meant an increase in 
reward (HIBBARD, 2012; BOSTROM, 2014). In general, our current training methods for the 
connecionist cognitive model are not appropriate for an AI or IAG (general artificial intelligence) 
operating in the real world. Possible scenarios of self-improvement, or even an “intelligence 
explosion”, as explained by the Intrumental Convergence Thesis (BOSTROM, 2012), can generate 
calamitous consequences for humanity (YUDKOWSKY, 2008). The ultimate goal of these agents is to 
maximize the reward, being our values and goals only instrumental to their ultimate goal. Such agents 
can learn that human goals are instrumentally useful for high rewards, but replaceable, especially if the 
intelligence of these agents is superior to ours (DEWEY, 2011). 
Whether by symbolic representativeness or by conexionist training, so far value objectives cannot be 
safely expressed, and given the importance of human value alignment with AI, new methods must be 
investigated. We propose in this article that the dynamic cognitive model offers a new way of thinking 
about the problem of alignment. In the following section, we will discuss some of the characteristics of 
the theoretical dynamic model of cognition. 
Dynamic Cognitive Model 
It can be said that many theoretical models begin as metaphors or analogies, later becoming theories 
that can be implemented in models and subsequently simulated. The conceptual structures that we 
form through this process can have a great impact on the way we conduct our studies, the way we 
approach the problem, the language we describe the phenomena, and the way we formulate a question 
and interpret an answer. The theory of dynamic systems invites us to think about the phenomenon of 
cognition and human experience in a progressive way, as proposed by Van Gelder (1998, p. 4), whose 
Dynamic Hypothesis postulates: “Natural cognitive systems are certain types of dynamic systems, and 
are best understood from the dynamic perspective. Dynamic systems, in this sense, are systems in 
which, as they evolve in time, their variables are continuously and simultaneously determining the 
evolution of one of the others, in other words, they are systems governed by non-linear differential 
equations. (van GELDER; PORT, 1998, p. 6) With this statement, the dynamist puts the agent in a 
situation of coupling with the environment, turning brain-body-environment into an autonomous 
cognitive dynamic system where it no longer makes sense to talk about cognition or experience 
without recognizing the three aspects of this triad (van GELDER; PORT, 1998, p. 23). 
A dynamic system is a mathematical abstraction composed of a space of S states, a set of time ordered 
T, and an evolution operator φ that transforms one state to another along T. S can be numeric or 
symbolic, continuous, discrete or hybrid, of any topology or dimension. T is typically expressed by the 
set of integers or real numbers, and the evolution of the operator φ can be deterministic or stochastic 
(KUZNETSOV, 2004). The situated activity has its philosophical origins in the phenomenological 
work of Heidegger (2012), which Dreyfus (1992) applying it to the field of AI, in which it is assumed 
that the heideggerian agent cannot be separated from the environment or its interpretative context. 
Gibson's Ecological Psychology (1979) is also a precursor of situated activity, with its notion of 
affordances: Gibson emphasizes the environment-organism relationship in the phenomenon of 
perception as a two-way street, where one perceives to act, and acts to perceive. The idea of situated 
cognition can be extended to theories such as “extended mind” (CLARK & CHALMERS, 1998), also 
known as ECH (extended cognition hypothesis) (ROCKWELL, 2010), which invites us to think in a 
different way with respect to Cartesian thought that places the imprisoned mind inside the brain. We 
explain gravity as the relationship between gravitational fields; electromagnetism by electromagnetic 
fields; the position of subatomic particles is expressed through probabilistic waves using Schrödinger's 
equation, De Broglie's wavelength and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. Thus, it seems likely that a 
sophisticated theory explaining the consciousness and experience of a cognitive agent involves some 
kind of theory that makes reference to the dynamic fluctuation of fields. 
The theoretical model we present in this article is SED (situated embodied dynamics), proposed by 
Beer (2000), which emphasizes how the cognitive experience arises from the dynamic interaction 
brain-body-environment. In the first place, SED takes into account the situation as being fundamental 
to cognition, placing concrete action, that is, literally acting in the world, as something more 
fundamental than the abstract descriptions of this action. Thus, the final work of the intelligent agent is 
to act, an action that occurs in an environment, which is a central part of the behavior, since it is what 
gives meaning and context to action. And the interaction of the agent with the environment is mutual, 
not being the environment just a source of problems to be solved, but a partner with whom the agent is 
involved from moment to moment (FRANKISH; RAMSEY, 2014). In the SED approach, the the 
concept of embodiment says that the physical form and its functional and biomechanical aspects are 
essential aspects for behavior, as well as its biology and physiology, in the case of artificial agents, 
mechanics, hardware and software. All these factors create the conceptual realization by which we 
create our experiences and representations. 
The thought of embodiment has its origin in the phenomenology worked by Merleau-Ponty (1962), 
who was moreover one of the forerunners of Gibson's notion of affordance (1979), placing body 
involvement as crucial to the way we perceive and act with the environment. Also being the biological 
structure that supports the vital cognition for the cognitive phenomenon, we must think about the 
implications or possibilities of this phenomenon being duplicated by electronic components, and 
which concepts and abstractions such formation could generate, given the importance of the embodied 
experience in the creation of abstract concepts (LAKOFF; JOHNSON, 1999). Thus, the role of 
language, metaphors and mental representations in the formulation of concepts used in scientific 
theories is evident, despite all ontological commitment to a certain scientific realism. In fact, the term 
“naturalized epistemology”, forged by W.V. Quine in his 1969 seminal essay “Epistemology 
Naturalized”, followed several of the epistemic premises of Hume's skepticism, which, as we pointed 
out above, solves every platonically inspired foundationism, including the dualism of Cartesian 
rationalism, in its pretension to justify an absolutely sure knowledge of the truth of the outside world. 
According to Quine (1969, p. 75): 
It was sad for epistemologists, Hume and others, to have to agree on the 
impossibility of strictly deriving the science of the external world from sensory 
evidence. Two fundamental principles of empiricism remained unassailable, 
however, and remain so today. One is that any evidence that exists for science is 
sensory evidence. The other is that any inculcation of word meanings must 
ultimately rest on sensory evidence (QUINE, 1969, p. 75). 
As in Quine, the Humean-inspired empiricism that interests us, from Dreyfus, Rorty, Prinz and 
neopragmatism, is intersubjective, falsificationist and, interestingly, externalist, that is, a form of 
social linguistic and historically co-constitutive pragmatism of observer subject and objective world to 
be known, experienced, lived. The problem of knowledge, as well as that of giving reasons for moral 
action, remains the great human problem according to the Humean formulation: in the words of Quine 
(1969, p. 72), “the Humean problem is the human predicament”, so that not even induction (such as 
that which has been adopted by models of reflexive balance in metaethics and philosophy of science) 
can solve the naturalistic fallacies that arise from the guillotine. The externalism of the naturalists, in 
the wake of Hume and Quine, would here oppose the internalism of the rationalists and Kant, 
according to which the epistemic justification for cognition and moral action is found in consciousness 
(cogito) or in a structure of transcendental subjectivity.  
Although we cannot develop here the internalist-externalist problem, we believe that the debate 
between rationalism and empiricism that preceded it authorizes us to assert, as Quine suggested, that 
Hume's great mistake would have been to reduce analytical judgements to a priori, universal, 
necessary judgements, as opposed to synthetic ones. In tur, they are reducible to posterior judgements, 
contingent particularities, without solving the problem of induction but allowing, on the contrary, their 
return through the back door, as Popper would show, by the self-deception of those who intend to 
justify the moral action with a transcendental or normativist argument. Our programmatic intuition on 
AI ethics is, therefore, that neither naturalism seems to be able to reduce the alignment to a utilitarian 
program, nor the deontological, normativist models and their transcendental arguments seem 
satisfactory to avoid anthropomorphic suspicion. 
Computational neuroethology is a distinct area of neuroscience, as it involves the creation of joint 
models of neural circuits, biomechanics and ecological niches as relevant parts of a cognitive agent 
(CHIEL; BEER, 1997). Work in the field of autonomous robotics emphasizes that intelligent behavior 
is an emerging property of an agent incorporated in an environment with which it must interact 
continuously. Thus, the symbolic computer vision, which places the brain as the source of commands 
that are issued to the body, may be incomplete. It is possible that there is a cognition or “mind” of the 
body (or mechanical system), governed by the laws of physics itself. This puts the nervous system not 
in a position to issue commands, but suggestions, reconciled with the biomechanical and ecological 
context (RAIBERT; HODGINS, 1993). There is the possibility that an AI that has an understanding of 
human concepts would require a design very close to that of a human being (SOTALA; 
YAMPOLSKIY, 2013). 
Finally, to understand the SED approach we must analyse the assumed dynamics. We refer to 
dynamics as a mathematical theory that describes systems that change over time in a systematic way. 
The dynamic framework also provides us with a different filter to observe the phenomenon in question 
(FRANKISH; RAMSEY, 2014).  Dynamic systems are certainly configured as a body of mathematics, 
and not as a scientific theory of the natural world. The most common examples of dynamic systems 
are sets of partial differential equations, used to describe phenomena such as the movement of water, 
behavior of electromagnetic fields, the position of subatomic particles among other natural 
phenomena. Thus, the dynamic perspective brings with it a set of concepts and filters that influence 
the way we think about the phenomenon studied; when approaching any system from the dynamic 
perspective, we try to identify a set of state variables whose evolution can explain the observed 
behavior, the dynamic laws by which the values of these variables evolve in time, the dimensional 
structure of their evolution, possible states and dominant parameters (BEER, 2000). 
Finally, the hypothesis of the situated, embodiedand and dynamic structure postulates that brains, 
bodies and environments are dynamic systems, governed by dynamic laws, and the dynamics of this 
triad are coupled, being the study of the behavior of the complete dynamic system, brain-body-
environment,  the correct object of study for cognition (BEER, 2000). The most crucial conclusion to 
be drawn from this model is: the behavior is a property of the whole brain-body-environment system 
and cannot, therefore, be adequately attributed to any subsystem isolated from the others. We propose 
that such an approach, SED, can be an interesting model for embodied agents and safe AI systems.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
How can this dynamic approach be useful for the problem of learning values? This has been the 
guiding question of this study. We have seen in this study the imminent advance of AI technologies, 
and the importance that such advances are made in a safe way, because we cannot anthropomorphize 
AI, and expect artificial intelligent agents to have the same terminal objectives (values) as us. 
Therefore, value learning becomes an area of crucial importance in the field. The limitations present in 
the representative symbolic method and in the conexionist model may be indicating to us that a 
different approach to the behavioural problems of intelligent agents should be considered. Dynamism 
certainly approaches the problem in a different way, and unveils new aspects that both the symbolic 
and the conexionist model leave aside. 
How should we understand the nature and role of this inner state within a dynamic agent? The 
traditional computational interpretation of such states would be as internal representations. 
Unfortunately, despite the fundamental role that the notion of representation plays in computational 
approaches, there is very little agreement about what its real function is in controlling and maintaining 
behavior. We should also remember that symbolism, connecionism and dynamism are theoretical 
structures, not scientific theories of the natural world, that is, they cannot be proved or refuted. While 
symbolism emphasizes the manipulation of internal representations, conexionism emphasizes the 
architecture of the network and the training protocol. The SED structure, on the other hand, highlights 
the trajectory space and the determining influences on the brain-body-environment system. It is 
possible that a dynamic approach to the problem of value learning will help us to elucidate some of the 
problems in value learning. However, as stated above, we do not put ourselves in a position of anti-
representationalism. On the contrary, a complete theory of cognition is likely to use all three 
theoretical structures. We suggest that in certain cases, as in goal-oriented behavior, the internal 
functioning of a dynamic agent cannot be interpreted as representative unless we refine what a 
representation really can be or mean. 
Gärdenfors (2000), proposes a general theory of representation, where concepts such as values are 
represented as geometric forms within a multidimensional space. Several brain modeling studies try to 
understand how the brain creates and manipulates information (KRIEGESKORTE; KIEVIT, 2013), 
and recent findings using simulations of cortical groups analyzed by algebraic topology show that the 
brain seems to organize itself in an orderly and geometric way when we analyze its structure as a 
multidimensional object (REIMANN et al. 2017). It is possible that similar structures, corresponding 
to the concept of value, are found in the hyperdimensional field that compose the cognitive agent.  
The dynamic approach differs from the symbolic and connectionalist cognitive models because it 
places biomechanics and ecology with the same relevance as neural activity in the phenomenon of 
cognition. Perhaps the difficulties we have encountered in learning values and other problems in the 
field of AI are due to the fact that we are ignoring two crucial factors of the phenomenon. The 
implications of the dynamic hypothesis not only bring a new way of thinking but also new problems to 
the field of AI research, thus nurturing new ideas in areas such as neurophilosophy, neuroscience, 
metaethics, computational neuroethology and the interdisciplinary field of cognitive science itself. In 
conclusion, an improvement and better understanding in dynamic systems concepts is needed, with the 
promise that such methods can be useful for the problem of value alignment in AI and for the 
cognitive science community in general. 
References  
ABADI, M. et al. Deep Learning with Differential Privacy. In: arxiv.org/abs/1607.00133, 
2016. 
ALLISON, H. E. Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant’s Theoretical and Practical 
Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
AMODEI, D. OLAH, C. STEINHARDT, J. CHRISTIANO, P. SCHULMAN, J. MANÉ, D. 
Concrete problems in AI safety. arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.06565, 2016. 
ASIMOV, I. I, Robot. New York: Doubleday, 1950. 
BARRETT, A. M. BAUM, S. D. A Model of Pathways to Artificial Superintelligence 
Catastrophe for Risk and Decision Analysis. Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial 
Intelligence, JETAI (29), nº. 2, pp. 397-414, 2017. Disponível em: 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1607.07730 
BEER, R. D. Computational and dynamical languages for autonomous agents. In: It’s about 
time: An overview of the dynamical approach to cognition. Mind as motion: Explorations in 
the dynamics of cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998, p. 121-147. 
BEER, R. D. Dynamical approaches to cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 4ª, p. 
91-99, 2000. 
BEER, R. D. The dynamics of active categorical perception in an evolved model agent (with 
commentary and response). Adaptive Behavior. 11ª ed, p. 209-243, 2003. 
BOSTROM, N. The Superintelligent Will: Motivation and Instrumental Rationality in 
Advance Artificial Agents. Minds and Machines, 22ª, p. 71-85, 2012. 
BOSTROM, N. Superintelligence, Chapter 12. Oxford University Press, 2014. 
BOSTROM, N. ĆIRKOVIĆ, M. Introduction. In: Global Catastrophic Risks, edited by 
Bostrom, N. Ćirković, M. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-30, 2008. 
BRYNJOLFSSON, E. MCAFEE, A. The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and 
Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies. New York: W.W. Norton; Company, 2014. 
CHIEL, H. J. BEER, R. D. The brain has a body: adaptive behavior emerges from interactions 
of nervous system, body and environment. Trends in neurosciences, Nº 20 V.(12), pp. 553-
557, 1997. 
CHURCHLAND, P. S. SEJNOWSKI, T. The computational brain. Cambridge, MA, MIT 
Press. 1992.  
CHURCHILL, R. R. ULFSTEIN, G. Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law. American 
Journal of International Law, 94ª ed, V (4), p. 623-659, 2000. dx.doi.org/10.2307/2589775 
CLARK, A & CHALMERS, D. J. The extended mind. Analysis 58ª ed, p. 7-19. 1998. 
DEWEY, D. Learning what to value. Artificial General Intelligence, p. 309-314, 2011. 
DIJKSTRA, E. W. The threats to computing science. Paper presented at the ACM 1984 South 
Central Regional Conference, Austin, TX, Nov. 16-18, 1984. 
DOCHERTY, B. L. Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots. New York: Human 
Rights Watch, 2012. 
DREYFUS, H. L. What Computers Still Can’t Do: A critique of Artificial Reason. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992. 
DREYFUS, H. L. DREYFUS, S. E. What artificial experts can and cannot do. AI Society, 6ª 
ed, V (1),p. 18-26, 1992. 
DREYFUS, H. L. Why Heideggerian Artificial Intelligence failed and how fixing it would 
require making it more Heideggerian. Philosophical Psychology. 20ª ed, V (2), 2007. 
ELIASMITH, C. The third contender: A critical examination of the dynamicist theory of 
cognition. Philosophical Psychology, 9ª ed, V (4), p. 441-463, 1996. 
FRANKISH, K. RAMSEY, W. N. The Cambridge handbook of artificial intelligence.  
Cambridge University Press. 2014. 
FREY, C. OSBORNE, M. The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to 
Computerisation? Technical Report, Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford, Oxford, 
UK, 2013. 
GÄRDENFORS, P. Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought. MIT Press. 2000. 
GIBSON, J. J. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Houghton Mifflin. 1979. 
GRACE, K. SALVATIER, J. DAFOE, A. ZHANG, B. EVANS, O. When will AI exceed 
human performance? Evidence from AI experts. arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.08807. 2017. 
HADFIELD-MENELL, D. RUSSELL, S. J.  ABBEEL, P. DRAGAN, A. Cooperative inverse 
reinforcement learning. Advances in neural information processing systems, p. 3909-3917, 
2016. 
HEIDEGGER, M. Ser e Tempo. Tradução e edição bilíngue com notas de Fausto Castilho. 
Campinas e Petrópolis: Editora Unicamp e Vozes, 2012. (1927) 
HIBBARD, B. The error in my 2001 VisFiles column. 2012. 
HUME, D. Tratado da Natureza Humana. Tradução de Débora Danowiski. 2ª ed. São Paulo: 
Editora da UNESP, 2009. (1739) 
JAYNES, E. T. Probability theory: The logic of science. Ed. G. Larry Bretthorst. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 2003. doi:10.2277/0521592712. 
KRIEGESKORTE, N. KIEVIT, R. A. Representational geometry: integrating cognition, 
computation, and the brain. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, nº 17, V.(8), pp. 401-12, 2013. 
KUZNETSOV, Y. A. Elements of Applied Bifurcation Theory. 3ª ed. Springer. 2004. 
LAKOFF, G. JOHNSON, M. Philosophy in the Flesh. Basic Books. 1999. 
LEGG, S. Is there an elegant universal theory of prediction? In: Algorithmic learning theory: 
17th international conference, ALT 2006, Barcelona, Spain, October 7–10, 2006. 
Proceedings, ed. José L. Balcázar, Philip M. Long, and Frank Stephan. Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science 4264. Berlin: Springer. 2006. doi:10.1007/11894841_23. 
LEIKE, J. MARTIC, M. KRAKOVNA, V. ORTEGA, P. EVERITT, T.  LEFRANCQ, A. 
ORSEAU, L. AI Safety Gridworlds. arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.09883. 2017. 
LLOYD, S. Computational capacity of the universe. Physical Review Letters 88 (23): 237901, 
2002. doi:10. 1103/PhysRevLett.88.237901. 
MERLEAU-PONTY, M. Phenomenology of Perception. New York: Humanities Press, 1962. 
(1945) 
MORAVEC, H. P. When will computer hardware match the human brain? Journal of 
Evolution and Technology 1998. Disponível em: 
http://www.transhumanist.com/volume1/moravec.htm. 
MORDVINTSEV, A. OLAH, C. TYKA, M. Inceptionism: Going deeper into neural 
networks. In: Google Research Blog. Retrieved June 20, 2015. 
MÜLLER, V. C. BOSTROM,  N. Future progress in artificial intelligence: A survey of expert 
opinion. Fundamental issues of artificial intelligence, p. 555-572, 2016. 
NEWELL, A. Unified theories of cognition. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. 1990. 
NG, A. Y. RUSSELL, S. J. Algorithms for inverse reinforcement learning. In Pat Langley, 
editor, 17th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML-’00), p. 663-670, 2000. 
OMOHUNDRO, S. M. The Nature of Self-Improving Artificial Intelligence. Disponível em: 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.137.1199&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
Acessado em 11 de agosto de 2019. 
QUINE, W.V.O. Epistemology Naturalized. In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1969, pp. 69–90. 
 
RAIBERT, M. H. HODGINS, J.K. Biological Neural Networks. Invertebrate Neuroethology 
and Robotics. Academic Press, p. 319–354, 1993. 
REIMANN, M. W. NOLTE, M. SCOLAMIERO, M. TURNER, K. PERIN, R. CHINDEMI, 
G. DŁOTKO, P. LEVI, R. HESS, K. MARKRAM, H. Cliques of Neurons Bound into 
Cavities Provide a Missing Link between Structure and Function. Frontiers in Computational 
Neuroscience. Nº 11, V (48), 2017. doi: 10.3389/fncom.2017.0004 
ROCKWELL, T. Extended cognition and intrinsic properties. Philosophical Psychology, 23ª 
ed, p.741-757, 2010. 
ROCKWELL, T. Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Non-Dualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain 
Identity Theory. Bradford Books, MIT press, 2005. 
SHULMAN, C. Omohundro’s Basic AI Drives and Catastrophic Risks. The Singularity 
Institute, 2010. Disponível em: https://intelligence.org/files/BasicAIDrives.pdf 
SMOLENSKY, P. On the proper treatment of connectionism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 
11ª ed, V(1), p. 1-23, 1988. 
SOARES, N. FALLENSTEIN, B. Aligning Superintelligence with Human Interests: A 
Technical Research Agenda. Technical Report, Machine Intelligence Research Institute, 
Berkeley, CA. 2014. 
SOARES, N. FALLENSTEIN, B. YUDKOWSKY, E. ARMSTRONG, S. Corrigibility. 
Artificial Intelligence and Ethics, ed. T. Walsh, AAAI Technical Report WS-15-02. Palo 
Alto, CA: AAAI Press, 2015. 
SOARES, N. Value Learning Problem. In: Ethics for Artificial Intelligence Workshop at 25th 
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-2016) New York, NY, USA 
9-15 July, 2016. 
SOTALA, K. From mostly harmless to civilization-threatening: Pathways to dangerous 
artificial intelligences. In ECAP10: VIII European Conference on Computing and Philosophy, 
edited by Klaus Mainzer. Munich, 2010. 
SOTALA, K. Disjunctive scenarios of catastrophic AI risk. Artificial Intelligence Safety and 
Security, pp. 315-337, 2018. 
SOTALA, K. YAMPOLSKIY, R. V. Responses to Catastrophic AGI Risk: A Survey. 
Technical report. Berkeley, CA: Machine Intelligence Research Institute. 2013. 
THAGARD, P. Conceptual revolutions. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 1992. 
TVERSKY, A. KAHNEMAN, D. The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. 
Science, Nº. 211 V.(4481), pp. 453-458, 1981. 
VAN GELDER, T. The dynamical hypothesis is cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences. 21ª ed, p. 615- 628, 1998. 
VAN GELDER, T. PORT, R. It’s about time: An overview of the dynamical approach to 
cognition. Mind as motion: Explorations in the dynamics of cognition. Cambridge, MA, MIT. 
1998. 
VON NEUMANN, J. MORGENSTERN, O. Theory of games and economic behavior. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1953. 
YUDKOWSKY, E. Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk. 
In: Global Catastrophic Risks, edited by N. Bostrom and M. M. Ćirković, 308-45. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008. https://intelligence.org/files/AIPosNegFactor.pdf 
 
